Security & Permissions
Session auth, CSRF, JWT, security headers, and the resource:action permission model.
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Security & Permissions
Login flow
sequenceDiagram
participant Form as Login Form
participant Auth as Auth.bx doLogin()
participant Sec as SecurityService
participant Store as cbauth / Session Cache
Form->>+Auth: POST /login (email + password)
Auth->>Auth: CSRF check + cbvalidation
Auth->>+Sec: authenticate( email, password )
Sec->>Sec: bcrypt verify
Sec->>+Store: cbauth.login() — write session
Store-->>-Sec: ok
Sec-->>-Auth: authenticated user
Auth-->>-Form: redirect → /dashboard
Authentication layouts
The authentication flow can use either shipped layout through the cbLoginLayout setting:
| Value | Layout | Best for |
|---|---|---|
AuthSplit | Branded feature panel on the left with the form on the right; it becomes compact on mobile. | Applications that want a branded, two-panel sign-in experience. This is the default. |
AuthCenter | Centered authentication card with the logo, form, and footer. | Applications that prefer a focused, compact sign-in experience. |
Choose Auth Center or Auth Split on the /settings page. The selected layout applies to login, registration, invitation activation, and password-recovery pages. See App Settings for the layout files and custom-layout instructions.

Single sign-on
cbSSO is enabled through app/config/modules/cbsso.bx. It uses cbauth as the
session authority, so local password login, passkeys, and SSO share the same
session and authorization rules. The login page renders a link for every
configured provider.
Google is the shipped example provider. Set these values in .env after
registering the callback URL /cbsso/auth/Google with Google:
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=
GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI=https://example.com/cbsso/auth/Google
From the project root, run the SSO identity migration:
box migrate up
This creates the user_sso_identities table used to link a local account to an
identity-provider subject. Run this before attempting the first SSO login.
In Google Cloud Console, create or select a project, configure the OAuth consent screen, and create an OAuth client ID with application type Web application. Add this exact authorized redirect URI, using the public HTTPS URL of your app:
https://your-domain.example/cbsso/auth/Google
Copy the client ID and client secret into the local .env file. The redirect
URI must be the same value in Google Cloud and GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI:
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=your-google-client-id
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=your-google-client-secret
GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI=https://your-domain.example/cbsso/auth/Google
Keep credentials out of source control. cbGenesis registers the Google provider
only when all three GOOGLE_* settings are populated, so the application can
still boot before SSO is configured.
Automatic account creation is disabled by default. To allow new Google users, explicitly enable it and restrict the permitted email domains:
CBSSO_AUTO_PROVISION=true
CBSSO_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=example.com,example.org
Leave CBSSO_AUTO_PROVISION=false when every SSO user must already have a local
account. Those users must sign in locally and use the profile's Link Google
account action before they can sign in with Google.
Start the application with your normal development or deployment command, then
open /login and select Continue with Google. Confirm that Google redirects
back to /cbsso/auth/Google and that the application sends you to the dashboard.
For an existing local account, first sign in with the password, open the profile
page, and link the Google account. Sign out, return to /login, and verify that
Google SSO signs you back into the same local account. If provisioning is
enabled, verify that a permitted domain creates a local user and that a domain
outside CBSSO_ALLOWED_DOMAINS is rejected.
After setup, identities are matched by provider and immutable subject, never by email alone. Existing local accounts must be explicitly linked before they can be used through SSO.
For clustered SAML deployments, configure cbSSO's samlRequestCacheName to a
distributed CacheBox region instead of using the default in-memory replay cache.
How cbSSO becomes a local session
cbSSO owns the provider protocol and callback validation. cbGenesis owns the decision that follows: which local account the verified identity belongs to, whether it may be provisioned or linked, and how it becomes an authenticated application session.
flowchart LR
Browser[Browser] --> Start[cbSSO start route]
Start --> Provider[Identity provider]
Provider --> Callback[cbSSO callback route]
Callback --> Authorize[cbSSO Auth.authorize()]
Authorize --> Event[CBSSOAuthorization]
Event --> Interceptor[SSOAuthorization.bx]
Interceptor --> UserService[UserService]
UserService --> Identity[(SSO identity records)]
Interceptor --> Security[SecurityService.loginSSO()]
Security --> Session[(cbauth session)]
Session --> Browser
The application registers app/interceptors/SSOAuthorization.bx for cbSSO's
documented CBSSOAuthorization interception point. The callback payload
contains the verified provider response and the provider that handled it. The
interceptor then follows one of two application-owned paths:
sequenceDiagram
participant C as cbSSO callback
participant I as SSOAuthorization
participant U as UserService
participant S as SecurityService
participant A as AuditLogService
C->>I: CBSSOAuthorization(response, provider)
alt Link intent
I->>I: Verify logged-in user and matching session intent
I->>U: linkSSOIdentity(user, response, provider)
U-->>I: Linked identity
I->>A: Record link success
else Login intent
I->>U: findBySSO(response, provider)
alt No local identity and provisioning allowed
I->>U: createFromSSO(response, provider)
end
I->>U: updateFromSSO(user, response, provider)
I->>S: loginSSO(user)
S-->>I: cbauth session established
I->>A: Record login or provisioning success
end
I-->>C: Store success or failure result for completion flow
Why this interceptor exists
cbSSO also provides a generic cbAuth integration listener. cbGenesis
intentionally sets enableCBAuthIntegration: false in
app/config/modules/cbsso.bx, because the generic listener cannot enforce the
application's identity and account-security rules. The custom interceptor is
responsible for:
- Matching identities by provider and immutable subject, never by email alone.
- Requiring an authenticated session and matching intent for account linking.
- Applying the provisioning and allowed-domain policy before creating users.
- Keeping local password, remember-me, passkey, and SSO authentication paths under the same cbauth session authority.
- Recording successful and failed SSO operations in the audit trail.
This separation is deliberate: cbSSO verifies who the provider says the user is; cbGenesis decides what that identity is allowed to do in this application.
For the upstream contract and the alternative generic integration, see the cbSSO interception points, identity-provider response handling, and cbAuth integration documentation.
Security layers
| Layer | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Session auth | cbauth with CacheStorage@cbStorages — server-side session cache |
| Password hashing | bcrypt via bx-password-encrypt |
| Password policy | SettingService.isValidPassword() — cbMinPasswordLength plus an uppercase letter, a lowercase letter, a digit, and a special character. Enforced server-side on registration, invitation activation, password reset, and profile password change; the Alpine $passwordMeetsPolicy helper mirrors it in the browser |
| CSRF protection | cbsecurity rotating token (30 min); the auto-verifier is off, and BaseSecureHandler verifies deny-by-default on every unsafe HTTP method instead — see Handlers & Routing |
| Handler security | @secured annotation → firewall redirects unauthenticated visitors to login, authorized-but-unpermitted users to dashboard.notAuthorized |
| JWT support | Configured for API access (HS512, 60 min, cache token storage) |
| Security headers | XSS protection, frameOptions: SAMEORIGIN, referrerPolicy: same-origin |
| API tokens | SHA/BCrypt-hashed per-user tokens with expiration and a daily purge scheduler |
| Rate limiting | RateLimiter interceptor throttles login, registration, and password reset by IP - see Rate limiting below |
Rate limiting
app/interceptors/RateLimiter.bx fires on preProcess - before routing, before any handler runs - and throttles five unauthenticated Auth endpoints by client IP:
doLogin,doRegister,doForgotPassword,doResetPassword,doActivateInvitation
A caller that exceeds the limit is redirected back to the form with a flash error; the request never reaches the handler, so a correct password submitted while blocked still does not log the user in.
| Setting | Purpose |
|---|---|
cbRateLimitMaxAttempts | Attempts allowed per IP, per endpoint, within the window (default: 5) |
cbRateLimitWindowSeconds | Window length, in seconds (default: 300). 0 disables rate limiting entirely |
cbTrustProxyHeaders | Whether the "per IP" in "per IP, per endpoint" comes from X-Forwarded-For or the raw socket address (default: true) - see Deploying behind a reverse proxy |
All three are editable at /settings like any other app setting - see App Settings.
X-Forwarded-For is a plain HTTP header - any caller can set it to anything unless something in front of the app (a reverse proxy or load balancer) strips whatever the client sent and sets it itself. Whether that's true is something only the person deploying the app knows.
- On (default): trusts
X-Forwarded-For/X-Cluster-Client-IP, matching a typical deployment of this app behind a reverse proxy or load balancer. If your proxy does not overwrite that header (or you're directly internet-facing with nothing in front of the app), a caller can spoof it to get a fresh rate-limit bucket on every request and to fake the IP recorded in the audit trail - turn this off in that case. - Off:
getRealIP()uses the raw socket address instead. Correct when the app is directly internet-facing, but if you are behind a proxy, every caller looks like the proxy's own IP - one blocked "IP" blocks everyone behind it, and every audit log entry shows the proxy's address instead of the real client's.
RateLimitService.attempt() is a sliding window: every attempt, allowed or blocked, resets the key's expiration to the full window from that moment. A key only cools down once it goes quiet for an entire window - which keeps blocking for as long as an attack continues, rather than reopening partway through. Each endpoint has its own counter (keyed by event:ip), so exhausting the login limit does not affect registration or password reset.
Counters live in the rateLimit CacheBox region (app/config/CacheBox.bx), which is in-memory and therefore per application instance. Behind a load balancer with more than one instance, each instance enforces its own limit independently - a caller could get cbRateLimitMaxAttempts free attempts per instance rather than in total. To share counts across instances, swap the rateLimit region's provider/properties for a distributed CacheBox provider (Redis, Couchbase, or any provider CacheBox supports) - no code change needed in RateLimitService or RateLimiter, since both go through the injected cachebox:rateLimit region.
cbsecurity configuration
app/config/modules/cbsecurity.bx is the single source of truth for the firewall:
{
authentication : {
provider : "authenticationService@cbauth",
prcUserVariable : "authUser"
},
firewall : {
autoLoadFirewall : true,
validator : "CBAuthValidator@cbsecurity",
handlerAnnotationSecurity : true,
invalidAuthenticationEvent : "login",
invalidAuthorizationEvent : "dashboard.notAuthorized",
rules : [] // authorization is annotation-based, not rule-based
}
}
prcUserVariable: "authUser"— the authenticated user is always available asprc.authUserin every handler, view, and layout.handlerAnnotationSecurity: true— this is what makes@securedannotations on a handler class or action actually enforce anything.rules: []— this app does all of its authorization via handler annotations, not cbsecurity's alternative URL-pattern rule list.
Permission model
Every permission is a slug in the form resource:action, seeded by resources/database/seeds/AdminData.bx:
| Resource | Actions |
|---|---|
users | read, write, delete, admin |
roles | read, write, delete, admin |
permissions | read, write, delete, admin |
settings | read, write, delete, admin |
auditlog | read, export, delete, admin |
admin means "full administration of that resource" and is always OR'd alongside the specific action a route needs, so a user holding roles:admin passes any roles:* check without also needing roles:read/roles:write/roles:delete individually. The seeder assigns all 20 built-in permissions to a single Admin role, granted to the seeded admin@cbgenesis.com user.


Enforce it on the handler — this is the real security boundary, resolved by cbsecurity's CBAuthValidator against the authenticated user's permissions:
@secured( "roles:admin,roles:read" ) // class-level: applies to index and any action without its own annotation
class extends="BaseSecureHandler" {
@secured( "roles:admin,roles:write" )
function create( event, rc, prc ) { ... }
@secured( "roles:admin,roles:delete" )
function delete( event, rc, prc ) { ... }
}
A comma-separated list is an OR check — any one of the listed permissions is enough.
Mirror it in the view — UX only, never the security boundary on its own. User.bx exposes hasPermission() on prc.authUser, available in any view or layout rendered through a secured handler:
<bx:if prc.authUser.hasPermission( "roles:write,roles:admin" )>
<button type="button" class="btn btn-primary" @click="openCreate()">New Role</button>
</bx:if>
hasPermission() accepts a string, comma-list, or array and does an OR check; hasAllPermissions() does the AND equivalent. Both are cached per-request via getAllPermissions(), which unions a user's à-la-carte permissions with every permission granted through their roles. Every existing admin view (sidebar nav, Users/Roles/Permissions/Settings) already follows this pattern — treat it as the template for new secured modules.
A user who fails an @secured check is redirected:
- Unauthenticated →
login - Authenticated, missing permission →
dashboard.notAuthorized
Related security services
| Model | Purpose |
|---|---|
SecurityService | Wraps cbauth's authentication service; login()/authenticate(), remember-me cookie management with token rotation, logout(), password-reset token issue/verify (cache-backed, not DB) |
UserService | requestEmailChange()/confirmEmailChange()/cancelEmailChange() - self-service email change, gated behind a PURPOSE_EMAIL_CHANGE action token so a new address is only applied once the user confirms it from their inbox |
APIToken / APITokenService | SHA/BCrypt-hashed personal access tokens — createToken() returns the raw token exactly once, revokeToken()/revokeAllForUser(), purgeExpiredTokens() on a schedule |
RememberToken / RememberTokenService | Persistent "remember me" browser tokens, rotated on every use |
UserActionToken / UserActionTokenService | Purpose-bound, single-use tokens — issue(), resolve(), consume(). Five purposes: PURPOSE_REGISTRATION, PURPOSE_INVITATION, PURPOSE_PASSWORD_RESET, PURPOSE_FORCED_PASSWORD_CHANGE, PURPOSE_EMAIL_CHANGE |
Passkey / PasskeyService | WebAuthn credentials for passwordless sign-in; cbRequirePasskey makes BaseSecureHandler redirect a user with none to profile/passkey-required |
AuditLog / AuditLogService | The audit trail. The AuditLogger interceptor writes sign-ins, sign-outs, and failed authentication/authorization automatically — see Architecture |
Passkey / PasskeyService | WebAuthn credential storage via cbsecurity-passkeys' ICredentialRepository contract |

Known issues
"This is an invalid domain" when registering a passkey
Passkeys are configured for the localhost domain during local development. If you open the application with an IP address such as http://127.0.0.1:8080, WebAuthn treats that as a different origin and rejects the registration with "This is an invalid domain."
Open the application at http://localhost:8080 instead. Passkeys registered for one origin are not interchangeable with another, so delete and register the passkey again if it was created while using a different host name.